Blog de Octavio Islas (México)

Bringing Polycentrism to Latin America

* Washington’s Latin American policy: a casualty of the Iraq distraction
* The region is going through a definitive transformation, with autonomous policymaking now becoming the norm
* Bush may be known as the U.S. President that inadvertently provided the coup de grace to the remnants of the Monroe Doctrine

Polycentrism has been reborn in Latin America, and Washington would be wise to adapt to that fact. Polycentrism is a system of interpreting a country's political activity around multiple and co-equal centers of sovereignty, characterized by parity and pluralism. While the rights and responsibilities to its citizens and to the international community are immutable, sovereign equality is at the core of the region. At the time that polycentrism first emerged as a concept in post-World War II Europe, its author, Italian Communist Party chief Palmiro Togliatti, represented it as an anti-Stalinist, but not necessarily as a pro-democratization initiative within the Soviet bloc. Translated to a Latin American context, polycentrism reflects an accelerated unraveling of the asymmetrical, post-Cold War hemispheric relationships in which U.S. influence was paramount.

Ironically, the emergence of polycentrism in Latin America marks a victory for democracy and pluralism as it affords individual states the theoretical possibility for realizing their sovereign aspirations. One could argue that it may have been tolerable for the U.S. to display its dominance in the past, when Washington's geopolitical imbalances were seen as being beyond challenge, but the Iraq War has reduced the U.S.'s regional presence, so that it can barely claim to be first among equals. Today, the U.S. is an Achilles, sulking in his tent, facing a band of leaderless, and mostly rebellious, Myrmidons. Since Iraq, Latin America increasingly has gone its own way, sampling the spectrum of novel experiences with previously untested partners – of which China, India, and Russia are the most prominent.

Importing the polycentrism witnessed in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s is illustrative of what the rest of the Hemisphere could soon be experiencing. It was to characterize a new geopolitical strategy, a relationship of putative equals that Eastern European communist parties achieved after de-Stalinization. In Latin America, the system could roughly be compared to the stand taken by the former Yugoslavia under Tito at a time when the country was evolving a policy of nonalignment with both protagonists in the Cold War. For years, Yugoslavia had been one of the Soviet Union's most important allies, but as the Cold War heated up, relations began to sour. Yugoslavia broke from Stalin's tutelage in 1948 and proceeded to pursue a foreign policy distinguished by a quest for equality in dealing with not only Moscow and Washington, but with other powers as well.

The Changing Reality of the U.S. Latin American Policy

No doubt the wayward U.S. initiatives in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East weakened Washington's acuity, but it was the U.S.' all-embracing engagement in Iraq that provided the major source of distraction which, regrettably, exerted a heavy cost on the Bush Administration's Latin American policy. Regional clashes and seismic decisions like the now defunct FTAA master trade plan have been crowded on the back burner. Meanwhile, the inability of the U.S. to conceptualize a viable Iraq end game has, in turn, affected its ability to recalibrate its policy toward Latin America. Indeed, the rise of the "New Left" in Latin America, led by Hugo Chávez, and nursed by his oil purse, may well be seen as an indication of the extent to which U.S. political leadership in the region has weakened. Area countries have indeed begun to develop their own unique positions on issues of overarching concern, ranging from energy, to defense policy, to poverty abatement.

Even though polycentrism in Latin America has not fully matured, area specialists would argue that the region is well on its way in that direction. In this new atmosphere, local stratagems for modernization and growth, once directed from the Treasury Department and the international lending agencies, are increasingly being transferred to regional institutions and are being made to conform to responsible local norms. Moreover, entirely new local financial institutions like the Chávez inspired Bank of the South are also being created and they compete with the previously unchallenged international financial institutions like the IMF. The Bank of the South (now numbering eight member countries) is a good example of how an increasingly skeptical population backs this initiative for a new architecture that actually assists average borrowers in efficiently obtaining much needed credits for economic development.

Calls to stand the U.S. Monroe Doctrine on its head can now be heard throughout Latin America. One sees evidence of this in editorial page essays by Latin American policy analysts, who now reject any notion of the infallibility of U.S. leadership. Today, they deride the thesis that the U.S. (and by extension, the Organization of American States) always knows what is best for the local populations, what conditions the U.S. should place on stepping up privatization reforms, and whether a return to a mixed economy would be good for the area. In addition, the Latin American public has matured to the point that it does not perceive the U.S. role as being inevitably constructive. In fact, nearly 80 percent of the population holds a negative view on the U.S. intervention in Iraq, which certainly does not help the White House's actual and potential efforts to win hearts and minds.

During George W. Bush's Presidency, the U.S. has used the issues of terrorism, drugs and human trafficking, and the Cold War's left over treasure chest of favored ideological targets (the Cuba embargo and various torpedoed socialist experiments elsewhere in the hemisphere) as strategic cover to serve its own narrowly perceived national interests, not necessarily Latin America's. Authorized by congressionally mandated annual certifications of the level of each area government's cooperation with Washington in fighting drugs, terrorism, and trafficking, the State Department instituted a scorecard of sorts, to measure progress in these and other matters of concern. Only now is U.S. policy beginning to question the post-Carter era, during which "trade not aid" has been repeatedly proclaimed as a guiding principle.

The Bush Administration is now trying to reverse course and belatedly help address social ills in Latin America by turning up the volume of aid in addition to promoting trade. This nascent shift at last recognizes that poverty and the need for more equitable distribution of resources are better addressed by local initiatives rather than by merely following Washington's often fallow trade formulae. Bush's visit to Latin America last March and the decision to give full attention to Latin American countries' concerns in addition to promoting the Administration's priorities on trade and the war on terror, was perhaps the best foray of the U.S. regional policy. Unfortunately for the U.S., this interest in a reinvigorated Latin American policy has since waned. Latin America, in essence, is still of secondary concern, further giving polycentrism ground on which to blossom.

Who "Lost" Latin America?

Paradoxically, the coming of polycentrism may prove providential for the area. Latin America is actively seeking resource-based trade pacts with China, India and Russia. The net result is that Latin Americans have started a process of "strategic soul-searching" for a new ideology – one that is antithetical toward what they perceive as U.S. short-sightedness when it comes to the environment, trade matters, and human rights standards and policies. The negative effect of this process, one that Washington has lamented, is that Latin America is also building relations with a raft of countries that the U.S. considers to be pariahs – such as Iran, North Korea and Libya. Overall, as a result of this process, today's political class in Latin America may very well want to genuinely address the shortfalls that have resulted from the region's entrenched sins of corruption and violence, the lack of fast-paced democratic development, and the creation of viable institutions.

Despite a potential positive effect on Latin Americans, a worrisome aspect for U.S. national interests is that Washington's global competitors are now gaining a foothold in the region and may insist on using it in the upcoming struggle for resources and power. The likely emergence of a multipolar world as a result of this scratching for critically important minerals, coupled with the fact that the new competitors will want to operate in Washington's long-claimed proverbial backyard, may come to be seen as a challenge to U.S. primacy. Moreover, it certainly may threaten what is left of a diminished State Department's capacity for a more engaged regional diplomacy, especially at a time when it must also maintain a growing vigilance in geopolitically sensitive areas like Eurasia, which by rebound, are also playing a significant role in Latin American affairs. To China and Russia, polycentrism in Latin America—especially with regard to events in Venezuela—is a welcome deflection from their own backyards.

Though outwardly commendable, Washington's catch-up effort at macro-planning may be too late. While there may be some prospect that Washington can reposition itself in the Latin American theater, this administration has run out of time. The next administration, of course, must try to repair these frayed relationships as completely as it can. It must better compete in all aspects of its presence and especially clearly communicate better America's core views in order to capture anew Latin America's hearts, if not minds. In short, the next administration must exhume some of the more enlightened aspects of past U.S. leadership rather than more narrowly safeguard certain interests like oil and other resources. Such a stand would permit U.S. initiatives to be targeted not only in its best interests, but for the region's common good as well.

This analysis was prepared by COHA Senior Research Fellow Zlatko Kovach and Director Larry Birns
November 28th, 2007

Is the “New Left” Simply More of the Same, or a New Political Force in Latin America?

* South American leftward shift here to stay?
* Latin Business Chronicle's malpracticing prescription Chávez is very different from Morales and Correa, though they all may face similar challenges.
* What does the Uribe-Chávez flap portend?

The rise of what some call the "New Left" in Latin America has become an increasingly hot topic over the last decade. But what does it really signify for the hemisphere? While some claim that these left-leaning nations reflect just an aberrant phase in the democratization process, others insist that this development is leading to the very embodiment of enhanced freedom, where citizens have the opportunity for their voice to be heard, an education as well as a job paying a living wage. The New Left movement seems to be taking a solid hold in the region: close to 60 percent of its population live under an elected leader who leans or is committed to the left of the political spectrum. While Venezuela's Hugo Chávez may be attracting the most media attention, Bolivia's Evo Morales and Ecuador's Rafael Correa are following close behind the ideological tenacity that they bring to governance and as a result, the region is witnessing transformative changes which seem to be more real than ephemeral.

In an article last October, the Latin Business Chronicle boldly argues that "To reverse Latin America's slide toward socialism, the United States must increase its presence through additional support for democratic, market-based institutions." Critics of this thesis would say that the problem with this prescription is that it is more a bromide than a call to arms in a righteous cause. The advice sketched out by that business-oriented publication is that conventional wisdom has it that private is better than public, that Enron and Parmalat put to shame the Army Corps of Engineers and the Surgeon-General, and that nations currently in the process of development most certainly should follow an orthodox, endemic and political path similar to that of the U.S. and the rest of the West. This advice in itself is similarly flawed due its narrow definition and erroneous concept of the region's contemporary context. In addition, the current debate, which the previous sentiment is only part of, has been founded on an all-too-narrow footing of controversial assumptions. These have led to a series of vacuous generalizations that fail to provide any additional clarity to a country that may be legitimately involved in current polemics regarding developing ideological splits, no matter where it finds itself on the spectrum.

Politics as Usual

Any relevant analysis of the "New Left" must take as a given that the characteristics of each country are specific if not unique. The mistake of taking such a high-visibility administration like that of Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, and using it as a benchmark for like-minded governments in the region, is made far too often; this appellation commits a disservice if it is used to obscure the political gradations of policy which distinguish one country from another and the depth of those differences. It is important to counter this overly simplistic tendency to amalgamate countries that challenge one aspect or another of the bona fides behind Washington's regional policy but nothing else. All the more so when the rest of the hemisphere is aggressively reacting to Washington's failed neo-liberal economic medications, which have dominated Latin America during the Clinton-Bush decades, and have done it little service.

The Force that is Chávez

To some, Chávez's style of leadership bespeaks of authoritarianism, but to others it etches an old-fashioned brand of populism that for long has been the conventional diet of politics. In part, this may be because the Venezuela strongman has built his base on policies that are personalist rather than institutional. This is most discernable in his proposed constitutional reforms that will be the subject of a referendum next Sunday and which would put an end to all presidential term limits, as well as extend the presidential term from six to seven years and grant extended powers in the advent of a state of emergency, to name a few of the scores of other changes. On October 23, riots broke out in Caracas against these proposed constitutional changes, led in large part by student groups coming from Caracas' major educational institution, Central University, and other members of the middle-class opposition. The marchers believe that Chávez's reforms, which have been approved by the legislature and will be voted upon in the upcoming December 2 referendum, are testing the outer limits of the country's democratic system and must be stymied. Many of these same factions earlier had protested the revisions to the education system which critics claim would risk political indoctrinization, as well as the earlier non-extension of the license of the rabidly anti-Chávez private television station RCTV and the alleged politization of the armed forces.

Nevertheless, what many critics fail to address is that Hugo Chávez's concept of "21st Century Socialism" is not meant to resemble the traditional form of a state-apparatchik-driven bureaucracy where favoritism is the burning ember that provides the energy to the political process. Rather, it is meant to be a potent mixture of socialist economic with constitutionalist parliamentary politics. In Gregory Wilpert's Changing Venezuela by Taking Power, Chávez defends his political vision by claiming that: "There is no solution within capitalism, one must transcend capitalism. Nor is it about statism or state capitalism, which would be the same perversion of the Soviet Union, which was the cause of its fall. We must reclaim socialism as a thesis, as a project and a path, but a new socialism. Humanism, putting humans and not the machine ahead of everything, the human and not the state."

Debate over the worthiness of Chávez's vision could be threatened with obsolescence in light of recent events that could threaten his grand design; perhaps a more relevant current question might be whether the Venezuelan leader will continue to generate broad enough support within his country as well as abroad to sustain and then amplify his plans for his country's future, even if he is successful in nursing their principle elements for now. The increased tension from protests that plagued the streets of Caracas since the last days of October has cast some doubt on whether Chávez possesses the knack to work public relations in his favor. His weak point always has been more due to an unstable style than a lack of substance; he easily is the most innovative public figure operating in Latin America today, in addition to being the most rambunctious.

The latest Chávez-style eruption occurred in his recent split with President Uribe over Chávez's apparent violation of an agreement between the two over the Venezuela leader's pledge that he would not directly contact the command structure of the Colombian army. This break-off could have an enormous ramification for US-Latin America relations if Washington decides to meddle in troubled waters. Clearly Uribe overreacted to Chávez's action, and may have been spoiling for a fight, perhaps as an aspect of his strategy to influence the passage of the proposed FTA by the US Congress—an issue that most likely will be manipulated to achieve a trade matter which has been in trouble up to now. Among the issues which COHA is researching right now regards the grief that the break-off of efforts to achieve a release of the hostages and internal pressures in Colombia for a resumption of Chávez's humanitarian efforts there.

Chávez occupies an immensely important leadership role for Latin America's left, but it is entirely unrealistic to expect any kindred nation to follow in his exact footsteps. His critics maintain that he is a missile whose guidance system sometimes fails with catastrophic consequences; while often he can be counted on to win, he doesn't always know what to do with his victory. While this might be a fairer charge to bring against Lula, who has governed as a centrist after running as a man of the Left, it certainly cannot be claimed as accurately describing the Venezuelan leader. Chávez led the historic outbreak in anger over the harsh structural adjustment policies which were imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund on such recipients as Venezuela and Argentina. Strings attached to loans emanating from these institutions allowed Chávez, with growing public support behind him, to assume the role of protector of the common Latin American and to arm him with the mission to lift his sword against the towering international lending bullies. As a result, the Venezuelan leader was able to generate an intense personal following while at the same time, the middle class opposition, some of whom originally had supported him, rapidly changed to despising his personage.

Bolivia's Indigenous Champion

The president of Bolivia, Evo Morales, has been bandwagoning on Chávez's "Leftist" train, vocalizing contempt for U.S. policies towards Latin America, while speaking out against Washington's outrageous treatment of the Cuban Five and regularly siding with Caracas when it came to condemning U.S. economic policies and its "imperialism." On October 30, Prensa Latina highlighted a Morales trip to Italy and reiterated his words that Bolivia faces two types of enemies, "the internal ones represented by oligarchic families, and the external one, namely the U.S. imperialism." However, Morales' trademark position is his passionate defense of indigenous rights, something distinct in focus from Chávez's ideological predilections and not historically frequently found high up in the agendas of Latin American leaders.

Like Chávez in Venezuela, as well as Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Morales has been spearheading an effort to fashion a new constitution for his country. This document would guarantee indigenous representation in congress as well as recognize the right to communal property. However, since the Constitutional Assembly began working on the new constitution in August of 2006, it has ended up at a dangerous standstill. The process has been bogged down by the battle between the nation's commercial and political center of La Paz and the colonial city of Sucre, as to which of these urban centers would be the country's capital (see "Capital Wars" by COHA Research Associate Cassidy Rush). Amid the bitter racial overtone between the largely indigenous-populated western highlands and the more Europeanized flatlands surrounding Santa Cruz, this struggle was more than symbolic. Fortunately for Morales, he just managed to finally get the Assembly seated after months of delay.

As these roadblocks illustrate, the current state of affairs in Bolivia is too divided to allow for the same type of evolution that Venezuela and even Ecuador have been attempting. This is where the similarities between Chávez and Morales cease. Whereas Chávez has created a movement around his persona, Morales saw an existing social movement and made it his cause. Thus, the confrontation in Bolivia is less about Morales and more about the structure of the social movement he is trying to mount. His status of peasant, farmer, union leader and indigenous is what helped carry him to the presidency, and not necessarily any charisma or high soaring political rhetoric.

Another Constituent Assembly

While Hugo Chávez in Venezuela may have initiated this generation's leftward canter in Latin America, with Evo Morales closely following, Rafael Correa of Ecuador is the most recent Latin American president to unleash reforms, that also are worthy of being branded with the "new left" emblem. Through a series of highly publicized moves, Correa is distancing Ecuador from Washington, without altogether breaking ties. Upon being elected president, he chose Chávez's Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) over continuing Free Trade talks with the U.S., and also has firmly maintained that he will not renew an agreement that allows U.S. forces to continue to use the controversial Manta airbase for its anti-drug efforts, after the lease has run out in several years. But perhaps the most contentious of all of Correa's actions as president has been his determination for the Constituent Assembly, which was created as a result of his referendum victory to draft another new constitution—the 19th in Ecuador's 180 years of existence.

In April, the referendum on the creation of the Constituent Assembly passed and on September 30th, the country elected members to that body. Correa's PAIS Party won 80 of the 130 seats, giving it an outright majority. Many speculated that this favorable tally would translate into an easy road for Correa, since he would be largely spared the insuperable political roadblocks that Morales was facing in Bolivia. However, this is only where the battle began. Correa's plans for the dissolution of Congress have met unexpectedly harsh opposition from many of its members. As Correa continues to call for resignations of certain legislators, the Ecuadorian congress continues to scramble for outside support. In late October, indigenous groups marched on the capital demanding the recall of congress, citing that the body was a hotbed of corruption, and a pawn of foreign corporations.

The Constituent Assembly belatedly has begun the vexatious process of drafting a new constitution; following its completion, it will be the subject of another referendum. However, according to a poll by Cedatos/Gallup International, the general public's awareness of the plans for the new constitution is hardly profound. Only 34 percent of the respondents actually knew what the ultimate goal of the Assembly was supposed to be, as was broached in the April referendum: 66 percent thought that it would do such things as "reform laws," "end corruption," and "lower prices." These statistics do not provide the international community much confidence in the seriousness or the effectiveness of the process. So is this a case of apathy on the part of average Ecuadorians, or is it a matter of a hidden agenda on the part of the government? This is where many critics of the leftward shift begin to be worried, as they fear that the line between this new movement and a quick transformation into an authoritarian regime or dictatorship could be all too easy to cross. It is not that Chavez, Morales, or Correa have exhibited even the smallest dollop of preference for dictatorial rule over a thriving democracy, but that the dynamics of confrontation inadvertently produce such visceral consequences. Unfortunately, despite all of the oratory to the contrary, Correa, to his great frustration, has not been able to close the gap between the actual steps being taken by the government and its future intentions and the public's awareness of them.

Leave it to Evolution?

Blindly lumping Correa and Morales in with Chavez could wrack up heavy costs in terms of accuracy and sensitivity to nuances. It may also be a mistake to seek congruency with the country's various factions when great importance lies in the differences that deserve to be acknowledged and ventilated. While other Latin American leaders recognize that Hugo Chavez is extraordinarily open to generously sharing his nation's wealth by aiding his less well-endowed neighbors, through his petrol-dollar diplomacy, not all of them are entirely enthusiastically behind these efforts. Unlike Chavez, both other presidents have opted to remain in the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) when Venezuela left in 2006, in favor of signing onto Mercosur. At the time, the Venezuelan leader announced that CAN was dead as a result of Peru and Colombia's pending Free Trade Agreements with the U.S. Now the tide has somewhat shifted, however, as Correa and Morales continue to resist entering into FTA's with the U.S. and are fighting to keep CAN alive and perhaps link it with Mercosur. By aligning with an administration with the resources that are available to someone like Chavez, Morales and Correa are able to cash in on the implicit rewards that can follow from such a relationship not just of convenience, but also of solidarity, while still being able to maintain their independence and keep their own unique goals in sight, is no small matter.

The unusually dour fate of leftist movements in Latin America rarely has given optimists much grounds for hope over their longevity. Yet it can be argued that there may never have been a time where socialism's modest prospects are so bright as they are in contemporary Latin America. This could be an important juncture in the region's history, and whether you would rather term it "populist," "leftist," "New Deal," or socialist, it is undeniable that the "new left" movement in Latin America is presently a force majeure, at least for the near future. Previous U.S. policies have done little to alleviate the region's griefs, and quite often have accelerated them.

The populist precursors to the presidencies of Chávez, Morales, and Correa, like Maurice Bishop of Grenada, Salvador Allende of Chile, and Michale Manley of Jamaica, in addition to Getúlio Vargas of Brazil, Lázaro Cárdenas of Mexico, and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, all had their differences at the time over how to unite around the common goal of affirming their nation's independence while, ultimately, encouraging further genuine development. Whatever insights one may hold regarding where Latin America is now headed, and whatever the personal demurrers one may hold, it does not appear to be merely more of the same.

This analysis was prepared by COHA Director Larry Birns and Research Associate Montana James

El lavado de cerebros en libertad es más eficaz que en las dictaduras

Daniel Mermet
Le Monde Diplomatique

El escritor Noam Chomsky de los EEUU habla de los mecanismos detrás de la comunicación moderna, un instrumento esencial de gobierno en los países democráticos, tan importantes para nuestros gobiernos como la propaganda es a una dictadura.

DM: Empecemos por el asunto de los medios de comunicación. En Francia, en mayo del 2005, con ocasión del referéndum sobre el tratado de la Constitución Europea, la mayor parte de órganos de prensa eran partidarios del "sí", y sin embargo 55% de los franceses votaron por el "no". Luego, la potencia de manipulación de los medios no parece absoluta. ¿Ese voto de los ciudadanos representaría también un "no" a los medios?

NC: El trabajo sobre la manipulación mediática o la manufactura del consentimiento hecho por Edgard Herman y yo no aborda la cuestión de los efectos de los medios en el público[1]. Es un asunto complicado, pero las pocas investigaciones que profundizan en el tema sugieren que, en realidad, la influencia de los medios es más importante en la fracción de la población más educada. La masa de la opinión pública parece menos tributaria del discurso de los medios.

Tomemos, por ejemplo, la eventualidad de una guerra contra Irán: 75% de los norteamericanos estiman que Estados Unidos debería poner fin a sus amenazas militares y privilegiar la búsqueda de un acuerdo por vías diplomáticas. Encuestas llevadas a cabo por institutos occidentales sugieren que la opinión pública iraní y la de Estados Unidos convergen también en algunos aspectos de la cuestión nuclear: la aplastante mayoría de la población de los dos países estima que la zona que se extiende de Israel a Irán debería estar completamente despejada de artefactos de guerra nuclear, comprendidos los que poseen las tropas norteamericanas de la región. Ahora bien, para encontrar este tipo de información en los medios, es necesario buscar mucho tiempo.

En cuanto a los principales partidos políticos de los dos países, ninguno defiende este punto de vista. Si Irán y Estados Unidos fueran auténticas democracias en cuyo interior la mayoría determinara realmente las políticas públicas, el diferendo actual sobre lo nuclear ya estaría sin duda resuelto. Hay otros casos así.

En lo que se refiere, por ejemplo, al presupuesto federal de Estados Unidos, la mayoría de norteamericanos desean una reducción de los gastos militares y un aumento, por el contrario, en los gastos sociales, créditos otorgados a las Naciones Unidas, ayuda económica y humanitaria internacional, y por último, la anulación de las bajas de impuestos decididas por el presidente George W. Bush a favor de los contribuyentes más ricos.

En todos estos asuntos la política de la Casa Blanca es totalmente contraria a los reclamos de la opinión pública. Pero las encuestas que revelan esta oposición pública persistente raramente son publicadas en los medios. Es decir, a los ciudadanos se les tiene no solamente apartados de los centros de decisión política, sino también se les mantiene en la ignorancia del estado real de esta misma opinión pública.

Existe una inquietud internacional relativa al abismal "doble déficit" de Estados Unidos: el déficit comercial y el déficit presupuestal. Ahora bien, estos solo existen en estrecha relación con un tercer déficit: el déficit democrático, que no deja de ahondarse, no solamente en Estados Unidos, sino de modo más general en el conjunto del mundo occidental.

Cada vez que se le pregunta a un periodista estrella o a un presentador de un gran noticiero televisivo si sufre de presiones, si le ha pasado que lo censuren, él contesta que es completamente libre, que expresa sus propias convicciones. ¿Cómo funciona el control del pensamiento en una sociedad democrática? En lo que respecta a las dictaduras lo sabemos.

Cuando se les pregunta a los periodistas, responden inmediatamente: "Nadie me ha presionado, yo escribo lo que quiero." Es cierto. Solamente, que si tomaran posiciones contrarias a la norma dominante, ya no escribirían sus editoriales. La regla no es absoluta, desde luego; a mí mismo me sucede que me publiquen en la prensa norteamericana, Estados Unidos no es un país totalitario tampoco. Pero cualquiera que no satisfaga ciertas exigencias mínimas no tiene oportunidad alguna de alcanzar el nivel de comentador con casa propia.

Es por otra parte una de las grandes diferencias entre el sistema de propaganda de un Estado totalitario y la manera de proceder en las sociedades democráticas. Exagerando un poco, en los países totalitarios, el Estado decide la línea que se debe seguir y luego todos deben ajustarse a esta. Las sociedades democráticas operan de otro modo. La "línea" jamás es enunciada como tal, se sobreentiende. Se procede, de alguna manera, al "lavado de cerebros en libertad". E incluso los debates "apasionados" en los grandes medios se sitúan en el marco de los parámetros implícitos consentidos, los cuales tienen en sus márgenes numerosos puntos de vista contrarios.

El sistema de control de las sociedades democráticas es muy eficaz; instila la línea directriz como el aire que respira. Uno ni se percata, y se imagina a veces estar frente a un debate particularmente vigoroso. En el fondo, es mucho más rendidor que los sistemas totalitarios.

Tomemos por ejemplo el caso de Alemania a comienzos de los años 30. Tenemos tendencia a olvidarlo, pero era entonces el país más avanzado de Europa, estaba a la cabeza en materia de arte, de ciencias, de técnicas, de literatura, de filosofía. Después, en muy poco tiempo hubo un retroceso completo, y Alemania se volvió el Estado más mortífero, el más bárbaro de la historia humana.

Todo aquello se realizó destilando temor: de los bolcheviques, de los judíos, de los norteamericanos, de los gitanos, en síntesis, de todos aquellos que, según los nazis, amenazaban el corazón de la civilización europea, es decir los "herederos directos de la civilización griega". En todo caso era lo que escribía el filósofo Martin Heidegger en 1935. Ahora bien, la mayoría de medios de comunicación alemanes que bombardearon a la población con mensajes de este género usaron las técnicas de marketing puestas a punto… por los publicistas norteamericanos.

No olvidemos cómo se impone siempre una ideología. Para dominar, la violencia no basta, se necesita una justificación de otra naturaleza. Así, cuando una persona ejerce su poder sobre otra -trátese de un dictador, un colono, un burócrata, un marido o un patrón-, requiere de una ideología que la justifique, siempre la misma: esta dominación se hace "por el bien" del dominado. En otras palabras, el poder se presenta siempre como altruista, desinteresado, generoso.

Cuando la violencia de Estado no basta

En los años 30, las reglas de la propaganda nazi consistían, por ejemplo, en escoger palabras simples, repetirlas sin descanso, y asociarlas a emociones, sentimientos, temores. Cuando Hitler invadió los Sudetes (en 1938), fue invocando los objetivos más nobles y caritativos, la necesidad de una "intervención humanitaria" para impedir la "limpieza étnica" sufrida por los germanófonos y para permitir que todos pudieran vivir bajo el "ala protectora" de Alemania, con el apoyo de la potencia de más avanzada del mundo en el campo de las artes y de la cultura.

En materia de propaganda, si de cierta manera nada ha cambiado desde Atenas, ha habido por lo menos cantidad de perfeccionamientos. Los instrumentos se han afinado mucho, en particular y paradojalmente en los países más libres del mundo: el Reino Unido y Estados Unidos. Es allí, y no en otro lado, donde la industria moderna de relaciones públicas, es decir la fábrica de la opinión, o la propaganda, nació en los años 1920.

Efectivamente, esos dos países habían progresado en materia de derechos democráticos (voto de las mujeres, libertad de expresión, etcétera) a tal punto que la aspiración a la libertad ya no podía ser contenida solo por la violencia del Estado. Viraron, pues, hacia las tecnologías de la "manufactura del consentimiento". La industria de las relaciones públicas produce, en sentido literal, consentimiento, aceptación, sumisión. Controla las ideas, los pensamientos, los espíritus. En relación al totalitarismo es un gran progreso: es mucho más agradable sufrir una publicidad que encontrarse en un cuarto de torturas.

En Estados Unidos la libertad de expresión está protegida hasta un grado que me parece desconocido en cualquier país del mundo. Es muy reciente. En los años 1960 la Corte Suprema alzó la barra muy alto en materia de respeto de la libertad de palabra, lo que expresaba, según mi opinión, un principio fundamental establecido desde el siglo XVIII por los valores de la Ilustración. La posición de la Corte fue que la palabra era libre, teniendo por única limitación la participación en un acto criminal. Si, por ejemplo, cuando entro a una tienda para desvalijarla, uno de mis cómplices tiene un arma y yo le digo "¡Dispara!", ese fin no está protegido por la Constitución. Por lo demás, el motivo debe ser particularmente grave para que se cuestione la libertad de expresión. La Corte Suprema reafirmó este principio a favor del Ku Klux Klan.

En Francia, en el Reino Unido y me parece que en el resto de Europa, la libertad de expresión es definida de manera más restrictiva. Para mí, la cuestión esencial es: ¿el Estado tiene el derecho de determinar lo que es la verdad histórica y el de penar a quien se aparta de ella? Pensar en ello termina ajustándose a una práctica propiamente estalinista.

A los intelectuales franceses les cuesta admitir que esa es su inclinación. Sin embargo, en el rechazo de una aproximación así no deben haber excepciones. El Estado no debería tener medio alguno de castigar a cualquiera que pretendiese que el sol gira alrededor de la Tierra. El principio de la libertad de expresión tiene algo muy elemental: o se le defiende en el caso de opiniones que se detesta, o no se le defiende para nada. Incluso Hitler y Stalin admitían la libertad de expresión de los que compartían su punto de vista…

Yo agrego que hay algo preocupante e incluso escandaloso en discutir estos temas dos siglos después de Voltaire, quien, como se sabe, declaraba: "Yo defendería mis opiniones hasta la muerte, pero daría mi vida para que ustedes pudieran defender las suyas." Adoptar una de las doctrinas fundamentales de sus verdugos, es hacerle un triste favor a la memoria de las víctimas del holocausto.

En uno de sus libros, usted comentaba la frase de Milton Friedman: "Producir ganancias es la esencia misma de la democracia"…

A decir verdad, las dos cosas son de tal modo contrarias que ni siquiera hay comentario posible… La finalidad de la democracia es que la gente pueda decidir su propia vida y hacer las elecciones políticas que le atañen. La realización de ganancias es una patología de nuestras sociedades, adosada a estructuras particulares. En una sociedad decente, ética, esta preocupación por la ganancia sería marginal. Tomemos mi departamento universitario (en el Instituto Técnico de Massachussets MIT): algunos científicos trabajan duro para ganar mucho dinero, pero se les considera un poco como marginales, gente perturbada, casi casos patológicos. El espíritu que anima a la comunidad académica es más bien el de tratar de hacer descubrimientos por interés intelectual pero también para el bienestar de todos.

En la obra que se le dedica en las Éditions de L'Herne, Jean Ziegler escribe: "Ha habido tres totalitarismos: el totalitarismo estaliniano, nazi y ahora es Tina (iniciales de There is no alternative, no hay alternativa), propuesto por Margaret Thatcher planteando el carácter ineluctable del capitalismo neoliberal, que no es otra cosa que un posible forma de globalización). ¿Compararía usted esos tres totalitarismos?

Yo no los pondría en el mismo plano. Enfrentarse contra "Tina" es afrontar una empresa intelectual que no se puede asimilar a los campos de concentración ni al gulag. Y, de hecho, la política de Estados Unidos suscita una oposición masiva a escala planetaria. Argentina y Venezuela han expulsado al Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI). Estados Unidos debió renunciar a lo que era la norma todavía hace veinte o treinta años: el golpe militar en América Latina. El programa económico neoliberal que se ha impuesto a la fuerza a toda América Latina en los años 1980 y 1990, hoy día es rechazado en el conjunto del continente. Se encuentra esta misma oposición contra la globalización económica a escala mundial.

El movimiento por la justicia, que está bajo los fuegos de los proyectores mediáticos durante cada Forum Social Mundial, trabaja en realidad todo el año. Es un fenómeno muy nuevo en la historia, que marca quizás el comienzo de una verdadera Internacional. Su principal caballo de batalla está en la existencia de una solución alternativa. Por otro lado, ¿qué mejor ejemplo de globalización diferente que el Forum Social Mundial? Los medios hostiles llaman a los que se oponen a la globalización neoliberal los "antimundialistas", cuando en realidad ellos combaten por otra globalización, la globalización de los pueblos.

Se puede observar el contraste entre unos y otros porque en el mismo momento, tiene lugar en Davos, el Forum Económico Mundial, que trabaja para la integración económica planetaria, pero en el único interés de los financistas, de los bancos y de los fondos de pensión. Potencias que controlan también los medios de comunicación. Es su concepción de la integración global, pero al servicio de los inversores. Los medios dominantes consideran que esta integración es la única que merece, de algún modo, la denominación oficial de globalización.

He aquí un buen ejemplo del funcionamiento de la propaganda ideológica en las sociedades democráticas. Es eficaz hasta tal punto que incluso los participantes en el Forum Social Mundial aceptan a veces el calificativo malintencionado de "antimundialistas" (o "antiglobalistas"). En Porto Alegre, intervine en el marco del Forum, y participé en la Conferencia Mundial de los Campesinos. Ellos solos representan la mayoría de la población del planeta…

A usted se le ubica en la categoría de los anarquistas o de los socialistas libertarios. En la democracia tal como usted la concibe, ¿cuál sería el lugar del Estado?

Vivimos en este mundo, no en un universo imaginario. En este mundo existen instituciones tiránicas, esas son las grandes empresas. Es lo que hay más cercano a las instituciones totalitarias. Estas no tienen, por decirlo así que rendirle cuentas al público, a la sociedad; actúan a la manera de depredadoras cuyas presas serían otras empresas. Para defenderse de ellas, las poblaciones sólo tienen un instrumento: el Estado. Ahora bien, este no es un escudo muy eficaz, pues, en general, está estrechamente ligado a los depredadores. Con una diferencia no desdeñable: mientras que, por ejemplo, General Electric no tiene que rendir cuentas, el Estado debe a veces explicarse ante la población.

Cuando la democracia se haya ensanchado al punto que los ciudadanos controlen los medios de producción y de intercambio, participen en el funcionamiento y en la dirección del marco general en el cual viven, entonces el Estado podría desaparecer poco a poco. Será reemplazado por asociaciones voluntarias situadas en los lugares de trabajo y donde vive la gente.

¿Los soviets?

Eran los soviets. Pero la primera cosa que Lenin y Trotski destruyeron inmediatamente después de la revolución de Octubre, fueron los soviets, los consejos obreros y todas las instituciones democráticas. Lenin y Trotski a este respecto fueron los peores enemigos del socialismo en el siglo XX. En tanto que marxistas ortodoxos, estimaron que una sociedad retardataria como la Rusia de su época no podía pasar directamente al socialismo antes de ser precipitada a la fuerza en la industrialización.

En 1989, al momento del hundimiento del sistema comunista, yo pensé que este hundimiento, paradójicamente, representaba una victoria par el socialismo. Pues el socialismo tal como yo lo concibo, o por lo menos lo respeto, implica el control democrático de la producción, de los intercambios y de las otras dimensiones de la existencia humana.

De todas maneras, los dos principales sistemas de propaganda se han puesto de acuerdo para decir que el sistema tiránico instituido por Lenin y Trotski, después transformado en monstruosidad política por Stalin, era el "socialismo". Los dirigentes occidentales no podían sino estar encantados por este uso absurdo y escandaloso del término que les ha permitido durante décadas difamar el socialismo auténtico.

Con idéntico entusiasmo, pero de sentido contrario, el sistema de propaganda soviético ha intentado explotar en su provecho la simpatía y el compromiso que suscitaban para muchos trabajadores los ideales socialistas auténticos.

¿No es cierto que todas las formas de autoorganización según los principios anarquistas han terminado hundiéndose?

No hay "principios anarquistas" fijos, una suerte de catecismo libertario al se le debería prestar fidelidad. El anarquismo, por lo menos como yo lo entiendo, es un movimiento del pensamiento y de la acción humanas que busca identificar las estructuras de autoridad y de dominación, pedirles que se justifiquen y, dado que son incapaces, lo que sucede con frecuencia, intentar superarlas.

Lejos de haberse "hundido" el anarquismo, el pensamiento libertario, está floreciendo. Está en la fuente de numerosos progresos reales. Formas de opresión y de injusticia que casi no se reconocían, y menos aun combatían, ya no se admiten. Es un logro, un avance para el conjunto del género humano, no un fracaso.

* Publicado en Le Monde Diplomatique - Agosto 2007
Traducción libre de Mabel Sarco para Mariátegui. La revista de las ideas

COHA Report. Colombia. The President and the Courts: Uribe’s Attacks on Colombia’s Highest Judicial Institutions

* The President and the Courts: Uribe’s Attacks on Colombia’s Highest Judicial Institutions
* In a far-fetched move, Uribe accuses a Supreme Court Justice of bribing a paramilitary leader to implicate the President in a murder scandal
* This is the latest incident in the tumultuous "parapolitics" scandal surrounding Uribe's antagonistic relationship with the courts

Even though Uribe's charges threaten judicial independence, his attacks invite no recrimination from Washington, contrasting with the U.S.' past condemnation of Hugo Chavez's putative interventions in the Venezuelan high courts

Uribe's stand could jeopardize his high-powered campaign for further financing of Plan Colombia and advancing the free trade agreement, which awaits a tough ratification battle in the U.S. Congress

As Colombia's corruption scandal continues to heat up, Colombian President Álvaro Uribe has turned his anger on a longstanding nemesis: the country's Supreme Court. In his most recent sortie against the Court, Uribe released a statement on October 8 accusing Supreme Court Judge Iván Velásquez of offering "benefits" to jailed right-wing paramilitary leader José Orlando Moncada Zapata (alias Tasmania), if, in exchange, Tasmania would testify that he had been involved in a murder plot with the President. On October 4 and 5, Tasmania testified in court that Uribe had been involved in a plot to kill another paramilitary leader, Alcides de Jesús Durango. Almost immediately, Uribe released a statement declaring that before the incarcerated paramilitary leader delivered this testimony, the President had received a letter from him claiming that he had been bribed by Velásquez to make this accusation against the Colombian President.

Velásquez denies the allegation, saying that while he did visit Tasmania in jail as part of his investigations, he never made any mention of Uribe or made any common cause with the paramilitary leader. The Supreme Court supports Velásquez' version of events, and condemns Uribe for his badgering and interference with its investigation. Human Rights Watch has also strongly criticized Uribe's statement, suggesting that "his repeated attacks on the court itself are a threat to judicial independence." For Uribe, charges placing him in a bad light could be destructive to any prospects of the U.S. Congress approving the proposed U.S.-Colombia free trade pact. Indeed, the Democrats are already concerned by the Uribe government's reputation for scandal and corruption, as well as Colombia's continued status as the Hemisphere's top country for the murder of trade union leaders.

The "Parapolitics" Scandal

Velásquez's inquiries are part of a broader investigation which the Supreme Court is undertaking to uncover corrupt ties between right-wing paramilitary groups and Colombian politicians, with a number of them allegedly being close to Uribe. Some 40 current and former congressmen have been implicated in the scandal so far. Since their commencement, these investigations have been uncomfortable for Uribe, to say the least, as a steady stream of his supporters are being revealed as "para-politicians" as their trials progress.

Findings of corruption are embarrassing enough, but association with the paramilitaries, which for decades have repeatedly been established as being heavily involved in the drug trade and in the sponsorship of brutal death squads, is particularly damaging. In February, Uribe's then-foreign minister, María Consuelo Araújo, was forced to resign after her brother, a senator, was arrested on charges of collaborating with the paramilitaries. Uribe's own cousin, Senator Mario Uribe, came under investigation in September, and he resigned from his position the following month. According to a Latin News report, he gave up his seat "so that he [would] not have to be investigated by the Supreme Court but rather by [Chief Prosecutor Mario] Iguarán," which he considered to be a more favorable venue for such proceedings. Critics claim that this is yet another attack on the court's credibility by the Uribe camp.

This scandal was only the latest stain on Uribe's controversial paramilitary demobilization process. In June 2005, the Colombian Congress had passed Uribe's controversial "Justice and Peace" law, which serves as the legal basis for his paramilitary demobilization plan. Under this measure, paramilitary members who openly participate in peace talks by disarming and confessing to their crimes can receive significantly reduced jail sentences. Human rights groups have been strongly critical of these steps, saying that it is an affront to blind justice to allow the paramilitaries – Colombia's worst human rights offenders – to get off with pitifully inconsequential sentences, given the gravity of their crimes. Former Colombian Minister of Defense, Rafael Pardo, argues that the law "[sends] society a message that crime does pay" and that victims of these brutal misdeeds have never been the government's top priority in the justice process. Criticism has mounted over the course of the demobilization process, as many of the supposed demobilized fighters are, in fact, re-arming and returning to some of their former haunts and picking up their only briefly interrupted criminal activities, particularly drug trafficking.

Past Controversy

Uribe has long been in conflict with the national courts. At the end of 2004, the Colombian legislature granted him permission to run for a second term, overturning the constitutional ban on consecutive presidential terms. The Constitutional Court threatened to overturn this ruling, citing irregularities in the proceedings, but in the end it succumbed to popular pressure and upheld the decision. When it became clear that the decision would be sustained, Jaime Araújo, one of the court's judges and longtime opponent of Uribe, resigned in protest over this patent trammeling of justice. Uribe's next major brush with the Constitutional Court occurred in May 2006, and this time the court was not cowed. It ruled that the provision of Uribe's "Justice and Peace" law, which gave prosecutors only 60 days to investigate the crimes acknowledged by demobilized paramilitaries, was unconstitutional. The Court also required all paramilitary assets, licit or illicit, to be given to victims as compensation.

Finally, in July of this year, the Supreme Court ruled against another provision of the demobilization law; the law had permitted rank-and-file paramilitary fighters to be tried as political criminals, allowing them to be pardoned. The Court ruled that the paramilitaries were actually guilty of the unpardonable offense of criminal conspiracy. Its argument was that the paramilitaries are not political rebels, but instead mercenaries who conspired with members of the Colombian military and government. Uribe, in turn, accused the Supreme Court of "ideological bias," because it does, in fact, recognize detained left-wing guerillas as political criminals.

Judicial Independence: An Essential Component of Democracy
Uribe's critics adamantly maintain that the President's continued attacks on the courts represent a threat to judicial independence and the rule of law. His recent actions are described as contributing to the erosion of Colombian institutions which has taken place during his tenure. In a recent COHA report, Manuel Trujillo observes that Colombia is beginning to fit the pattern of a "delegative democracy," in which one elected leader is now given free reign to govern the country according to his own judgment, with very little countervailing force at work. This type of regime is incompatible with even 19th century democracy, not to mention the network of institutions which have since been developed and today are critical to a normally functioning representative democracy, including an independent judiciary. This incompatibility arises because these important institutions represent a vital check on the power of the delegated leader. Among other examples, Trujillo cites Uribe's overturning of the single-term limit for the Colombian presidency as evidence that he is shaping the country as he sees fit, as well as undermining important institutional checks on the presidency.

Judicial independence has long been considered an important part of a fully-functioning democracy. A recent cross-country study by Rafael La Porta and others tests the links between judicial independence and the exercise of constitutional review on the one hand, and levels of democracy, political rights, human rights, and economic freedom on the other. In their conclusion, the authors find that "checks and balances coming from the judiciary are an important determinant of political and economic freedom." Another recent study, by economists Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voigt, finds that de facto judicial independence actually can positively affect a country's level of per capita GDP.

Independence of the judiciary takes time to establish, and given Colombia's explosive history, it cannot be considered as automatic. Prior to the 1960s, the country's Supreme Court was relatively weak; it is only in the last few decades that it has begun to gain significant independence. Furthermore, the Colombian judicial system continues to struggle against corruption, intimidation, and outright violence. For example, in 1985, an armed team – probably hired by the Medellín cartel – attacked the Supreme Court, burning documents needed to justify the extradition of Medellín drug lords. Half of the justices were killed in a bungled rescue attempt.

Conclusion

It is unclear exactly what motivated Uribe's most recent savage verbal attack on the Supreme Court. According to a recent Latin News report, it seems highly unlikely that Tasmania's testimony squares with the truth, as it is doubtful that the President would risk everything he has accomplished by becoming involved in such a gross scandal. On the other hand, the report continues, it "seems equally far-fetched that the Supreme Court would fabricate a case against Uribe even at a time when relations between the court and the executive are in a critical state." Given that Tasmania most likely lied both in his letter to Uribe and in his testimony, it is unclear why Uribe would make so much of the allegations that have been made against him, especially considering the ease with which such claims made by paramilitary criminal sources could be discredited. One clear possibility, however, is that Uribe is trying to discredit the Court; indeed, that Uribe's allegations followed so closely the Court's investigations of Mario Uribe is obviously suggestive, a point Velásquez has publicly raised.

Washington's reaction to Uribe's recent actions has been minimal, in contrast to the strong criticism of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's changes to his country's Supreme Court in 2004. Chávez added seats to the Supreme Court and, according to Human Rights Watch and others, stacked it with his supporters.

Uribe has done many good things for Colombia – particularly in the area of national security – but in the process he has contributed to the erosion of important democratic institutions, and has confused his personal interests with those of the nation. In terms of the magnitude of the scandals surrounding him, he has been dubbed by some as the Colombian Lula. The Colombian people and the international community – especially the U.S., Colombia's major ally – would be wise to attempt to persuade Uribe against further undermining the highest levels of the nation's already embattled judicial system.

This analysis was prepared by COHA Research Associate Brent Buxton

Brasil: Lula defiende la reelección en Venezuela
BRASIL… ARGOS: NOVIEMBRE 16 DE 2007…
Afp y Reuters

El presidente brasileño, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, salió hoy en defensa de su par venezolano, Hugo Chávez, al afirmar que ni la democracia en Venezuela ni su voluntad de concurrir a un tercer mandato pueden ser cuestionadas.

Lula reclamó que las críticas que se hacen a la reforma constitucional promovida por Chávez, que permite la relección presidencial continua, no fueron hechas en el pasado a los consecutivos mandatos de numerosos líderes europeos como Margaret Thatcher o Felipe González.

“La gente se queja de que Chávez quiera un tercer mandato. ¿Por qué nadie se quejó cuando (la ex primera ministra británica) Margaret Thatcher pasó tantos años en el poder?”, criticó Lula.

“Nadie se queja de (el ex presidente del gobierno español) Felipe González que se quedó tantos años, nadie se queja de (el ex presidente francés François) Mitterrand, que se quedó tantos años, nadie se queja de Helmut Köhl que se quedó casi 16 años. Lo que necesitamos es respetar la autonomía y la soberanía de cada país”, afirmó Lula en declaraciones a la prensa en Brasilia.

“Inventen una cosa para criticar a Chávez, pero no por falta de democracia. Llevo cinco años en el poder (desde enero de 2003) y participé (en ese periodo en Brasil) de dos elecciones para presidente y dos para alcalde. Que yo sepa en Venezuela (en ese mismo periodo) ya hubo tres referendos, tres elecciones, cuatro plebiscitos. Lo que no falta en Venezuela es discusión”, dijo Lula.

“En democracia, sometemos lo que creemos al pueblo, el pueblo decide y nosotros acatamos el resultado, porque si no, no es democracia”, concluyó.

Lula además minimizó el altercado entre Chávez y el rey Juan Carlos de Borbón durante la Cumbre Iberoamericana, en Santiago. “Esas cosas ocurren. La diferencia fue que el rey estaba en la reunión; el que dijo ‘cállate’ fue el rey, no uno de nosotros, porque entre nosotros discutimos mucho”, concluyó el gobernante brasileño.

Bolivia’s “Agrarian Revolution” Hanging In

* Constituent Assembly’s partisanship holds back constitutional reform process
* President Morales’ land reform proposal is being challenged, as his strategy to get through other issues, seems to be flagging
* Bolivia’s experience could set the stage for land reform initiatives elsewhere in the region

Land redistribution since 1952 has been a major, if intermittent, factor in Bolivian national life. In recent years it has attracted renewed interest, returning as a major economic initiative under President Evo Morales' "Agrarian Revolution," mainly in the eastern part of the country which is known as the "Media Luna." This region was largely ignored in the previous agrarian reform effort over 50 years ago and is where the major opposition to Morales resides today. The President's Movement towards Socialism (MAS) party has fielded a comprehensive agrarian reform that will fulfill economic and social provisions scheduled to be engrossed in the country's proposed constitution. Agrarian reform remains one of the half dozen unresolved issues, which are supposed to be addressed by the constituent assembly meeting in Sucre, is aimed at redistributing land to the landless. This is to be achieved principally by reaching out to indigenous communities and other landless to ensure that the demands of campesinos and migrants moving from the poor western part of the country to the more affluent east are being met.

Contemporary agrarian reform involves a critical re-arrangement of agrarian practices, some of which look back to ancestral times, which were mainly orientated to the western highlands and are not an obvious priority right now in MAS' grand strategy. Current lowland indigenous land rights are also an issue in the struggle but the parcels are much less quantifiable even though they tend to be huge in size. In this process, the government expropriates and then redistributes the targeted land, if need be, in parcels conforming to various priority categories, beginning with dividing up public land into individual or jointly-held communal properties located, for the most part, in the eastern part of the country. Examples of this proposal are best found in Santa Cruz. This category also covers large, but non-productive estates taken over from relatively small numbers of wealthy landholders, which in theory is the plan but so far not in practice. The affected landholders have been far more concerned with land speculation than with matters dealing with productivity of their properties which, if expropriated, are then sub-divided and given over to landless cultivators. At times, forcibly removing landed owners opposed to such reforms provokes pitched battles, even resulting in violence on both sides.

Bolivia's History of Agrarian reform

Latin America has experienced a long history of sharply unequal living standards and skewed land distribution figures, with Bolivia turning in one of the worst performances in terms of statistics, in all of South America. Bolivia is dramatically different from other countries in respect to the significant campesino and indigenous classes, its unique history, and its traditional, intense connections to the land. Local agricultural fields also account for a significant share of the country's entire market.

The period leading up to Bolivia's epochal 1952 revolution was marked by growing social unrest and economic decline. As early as 1946, domestic turmoil had begun to mount when trade union leaders issued a call for permanent revolution and violent armed struggle on the part of the working class. With the labor sector becoming steadily more radicalized, the government resorted to even more repressive actions, including the dismissal of 7,000 miners in a period of three months.

In the early 1950s, the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) emerged as the dominant opposition force even though its head, Victor Paz Estenssoro, had earlier been forced into exile in Argentina. The MNR espoused a working-class ideology and also stressed, importantly, its support for indigenous rights. In the presidential election of May 1951, Estenssoro, still in exile, nevertheless entered the race. With Hernan Siles Zuazo as his vice presidential candidate, Paz Estenssoro ran on a platform of nationalization, primarily focusing on critical sectors of the economy and on an extensive agrarian reform program. However, struggles between the outgoing and incoming parties brought the military into the picture, preventing the victorious MNR from taking office. Thus by 1952, the country's economy was in rapid decline while social unrest continued to grow.

At that time, Bolivia's economy was suffering at the hands of fluctuating international markets and a weak agricultural sector that was also seriously under-capitalized and non-competitive; food imports were increasing, reaching an alarming 19 percent of total imports by 1950 and placing a heavy burden on the treasury.

Bolivia contains somewhat over 180 million hectares of arable land, most of which during this period was grossly unequally distributed and with about 4 percent of landowners possessing 82 percent of the land. As a result, social unrest ensued; at this point, the MNR launched an uprising in La Paz and then proceeded to seize arsenals and distribute weapons to sympathetic civilians. Armed miners marched into the city and blocked pro-government troops, which were on their way to reinforce the government authorities. After several days of fighting the army surrendered and the MNR's Paz Estenssoro assumed the presidency on April 16, 1952.

MNR Plunges into Agrarian reform

The revolution was promptly followed by a barrage of agrarian reform measures which served as a model for several subsequent programs staged elsewhere in the region. The new government emancipated indigenous people from a relationship of bondage associated with the oppressive life on the latifundios, where they had lived entirely marginal existences. The Bolivian reform being promoted at that time affected 79 million acres of land, which were distributed to 40,000 medium- and small-sized family farmers. At the same time, more than a half a million indigenous and peasant families divided up only about ten million acres, almost exclusively in the less favorable western highlands of the country.

By 1970, only 45 percent of eligible Bolivian peasant families had received titles to their land, due in part to the successive dictatorships which came to power during this period. Huge land parcels were handed out to speculators and swindlers who often posed, for legal purposes, as agricultural entrepreneurs. In the east, autocratic officials also spurned indigenous claims to land, encumbering their efforts with heavy, often unfathomable, bureaucratic red tape. Thus, broad disparities in land ownership still remained. Even today, almost 60 percent of Bolivian farmers live in the rural highlands, where the land is the least fertile, accounting for only 40 percent of rural income. Rural societies reflect the complex land tenure history that communities had endured in the past, including the aforementioned attempt at agrarian reform, which allowed for uneven political and economic development. Nevertheless, the reforms had brought about impressive changes within western highland indigenous communities, populated mainly by the Aymara and Quechua peoples, whose previous access to goods and services had always been limited and were still heavily circumscribed.

The rise of campesino protest movements over the decades had offered a platform from which they could endeavor to improve their conditions and fashion policies in accordance to what they believed was their right to land. One crucial event occurred in 1990, when a march of eastern lowland indigenous groups, who previously had been passed over from benefiting from agrarian reform, descended on La Paz from the departments of Santa Cruz and Beni. The increasing deforestation of their eastern region for logging, cattle ranching, soybean farming, and land speculation threatened to degrade the territories that these indigenous lowland peoples traditionally had depended upon for their livelihood. They demanded the recognition of their ancestral territories and, in doing so, earned wide public support. This period was considered to be the beginning of modern land protests in Bolivia and the first call for a new constitutional assembly that would result in the drafting of a more equitable document.

The need to resolve land conflicts was high on the presidential agenda during conservative Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozado's first term (1993 to 1997), thereby, prompting a modest amount of land titling and agrarian reform initiatives. His government eventually enacted the 1996 National `Agrarian Reform Service Law INRA, which along with encouraging the formation of collectives in indigenous communities, sought to address corruption in the Agrarian Reform Council, as well as attempting to finally define productive use of land and determine the legality of various categories of land titles.

However, the project was left largely unfinished, despite the millions of euros poured into it by the EU, a primary funder. The uneven nature of the effort could be witnessed by the fact that although small landholdings were being awarded in the highlands and the western valleys, enormous ranches were being created in the tropical zones of the east. The failure of the program over a decade, where less than 1/10 of the land requiring it was actually re-titled, forced a recent commitment out of Morales to emphatically address the issue.

The Morales Presidency

President Evo Morales revived agrarian reform initiatives when he took office in 2006. That same year, the Bolivian Senate passed a measure authorizing the government to present land titles to 60 indigenous communities, accounting for a total of almost 3 million hectares. In addition, Morales hoped to distribute 20 million hectares of land among the nation's mostly poor indigenous populaces over the next five years. The bill, which was also first passed by the MAS-controlled lower house of the legislature, was then blocked by a number of conservative groups. However, three opposition suplente senators (persons that, in Bolivia, legally sit in when the titular, the primary legislator, is unavailable because of illness or travel restrictions) changed their allegiance at the last moment to vote in favor of the pro-Morales measure, following a tumultuous rally in La Paz. This gave the president the backing of 15 of the 27 senate seats, representing a majority in Morales' favor. In spite of what appeared to be a winning strategy, the narrowness of the vote has become grounds for the government to worry if attendant laws will be applied in Sucre as well as La Paz, since the struggle goes on as to which will be the capital.

Last year, MAS controlled the presidency but not a working majority in the Senate, which it has since completely lost, hence one of the reasons why MAS wants, under the new constitution, to do away with the Senate all together. MAS Senator, Santos Ramirez, called for an extraordinary midnight Senate session, without bothering to advise the opposition Social and Democratic Power (PODEMOS), and other opposition titular Senators. However, he did convoke two suplentes, one being from PODEMOS. However, in this case, opposition titulares were not advised of the session, so technically, the outcome can be seen as being fraudulent, or at least suspicious.

The reform program could eventually affect about 13 percent of Bolivia's land expanse involving about 28 percent of its people, out of that one-third of the land already being owned by the state and the other two-thirds reclaimed from individuals or companies. Those who could benefit in particular would come from Bolivia's eastern lowlands, who previously had tended to not hold legal title to their land. (88 percent of agrarian reforms enacted between 1953 and 1992 are estimated as having benefited corporate interests). Soon after the legislation came into effect, 2,300 land titles and 50 new tractors were distributed to local campesinos. Morales stated that agrarian reform "aims to end historic inequality in land redistribution. The concentration of land and the latifundio are part of the exclusion and discrimination that indigenous and peasant farmers are experiencing in the Bolivian countryside."

Will They Still Remain Empty Promises?

Morales' reform program is to be applauded and has been so by many specialists in the subject. Roger Burbach, the highly regarded director of the Center for the Study of the Americas (CENSA), hailed it as a "historic victory." Pledges of redistribution, as well as plans to re-write the constitution, have provoked a huge outcry from the largely upper and middle class opposition who live mainly in the eastern, more Europeanized area of the country. The opposition to agrarian reform includes the elected governors of the immediate area, who fear that President Morales would use the constituent assembly to impose the beliefs and practices of the Andean-Indian communities by stressing a "communist model." Because of this, the east would stand to lose the most. Easterners are also worried that agrarian reform will flood the lowland communities with impoverished indigenous immigrants from the western part of the country, tipping the social and political balance as well as adversely altering present demographics. The wealthiest groups in Santa Cruz and other eastern regions have threatened to use force to defend their property, and have announced the formation of armed defense committees to guard their land against the landless peasant movement, known as the MST (Movimiento Sin Tierra), founded in 2000.

Putting agrarian reform to work

The "Agrarian Revolution," according to Morales, would enable the government to gradually do away with the eastern latifundios and recover the lands that are not being efficiently worked, as he put it: "all of these lands that are being hoarded for speculative purposes or that are in the hands of large landowners, have to go to the peasant or indigenous farmers who are suffering from a scarcity of land for production, and who are subsisting only on crops they can grow in the family or community." For example, under the dictatorship of General Hugo Banzer (1971-1978), thousands of hectares of land were handed out to friends and cronies of the dictator, most of whom never cultivated it but merely held their acreage as collateral to obtain loans for other purposes. Therefore, Morales, who in fulfilling his campaign promise to allocate more land to the indigenous communities and campesinos, has prompted sometimes bloody, social clashes. Characteristically, these have been between the upper and middle class landowners and landless campesinos.

A more recent, welcomed and peaceful announcement made by Morales, took place in July this year, when the president granted the Chiquitano indigenous group permanent land titles in Monte Verde, its ancestral territory of almost 2.5 million acres, located in the south-eastern portion of the department of Santa Cruz. The U.K relief agency, Oxfam, welcomed this historic move and congratulated the native group for its persistent efforts over the last 12 years, which resulted in this peaceful revolution. "This allows the Chiquitano people to recover land which traditionally has belonged to them," said Jorge Velazquez of Oxfam International in Bolivia. "It is the beginning of a new stage of their history." This land titling victory, after decades of campaigning by bitterly frustrated indigenous groups and grassroots movements, recognizes the Chiquitano people's ownership of its land, which will enable them to strengthen their development initiatives as they seek to find the best way to manage their forests and renewable resources for future generations. This type of progressive action will also further encourage other regions of Bolivia to follow suit with a constructive form of activism after witnessing tangible displays of what such cooperative efforts can bring about.

Agrarian Distribution

Nevertheless, Morales' "Agrarian Revolution," has not moved as quickly as some would have preferred. The Bolivian president does not want to disruptively upset the status quo; neither does he wish to short-circuit some proven efficient and traditional land-use practices, based on the maintenance of large productive commercial plantations that efficiently produce cash crops. Because of this recognition, at the present time, such land holdings are exempted from being expropriated by the government, even though these wealthy landowners axiomatically play a prominent role within the middle class political opposition, buttressing it in their anti-agrarian reform stand. A reform measure was only narrowly passed by the Bolivian legislature in 2006, with the dominating elite in the eastern part of the country still vigorously protesting its application.

Up to this point, most landowners have somehow averted the government's newly mandated regulations, according to Douglas Hertzler of the Andean Information Network. They managed to do this by keeping one or two calves on the land that technically qualified them for their allotted plots, or by claiming that family members also work the land and are thus entitled to their own individual parcels, while they alternatively claim that their land is being dedicated as an ecological preserve. Hertzler, while admitting that government progress on agrarian reform on the whole has been slower than was originally hoped for, is now confident that there seems to be an even greater prospect for positive results than before. At the same time, the large landowners are gradually losing their political dominance. They are also losing clout with their negative anti-indigenous attitudes that are anathema to many, including some of their traditional conservative allies, as emphasized by Miguel Urisote of the Land Foundation.

Some observers are hoping that the remaining 15 million hectares of the 20 million proposed for agrarian reform will be transferred over within the next five years. The consistency of Morales' promise of not submitting productive land to the nationalizing process still has some way to go before the middle class political opposition is reassured that it is binding. This point is emphasized in the Washington Post, "The protestors are not in the dark about his [Morales] well thought out plans – land which is productive and legally owned will thus remain so." One has seen what the indigenous groups can achieve when, with determination, they have set out to dramatically change their conditions after centuries of discrimination. Now, with Morales as the country's first indigenous president, expectations remain high but, nevertheless, are beginning to decline.

Conclusion

One school of thought argues that the aim of agrarian reform should be to absorb as many of the region's landless workers and indigenous groups in the east as possible so that the land can be put out to productive use for agricultural cultivation. Growth with equity should also focus on supporting and developing the poorer rural region, with the long-term goal being the procurement of international financial and technical support. US officials have tended to describe the public protestors of the agrarian reform as 'farmers' when in reality they are the lowland agribusiness elite and their flock which all along has tenaciously fought to prevent the assistance needed to fuel the ambitious and agrarian reform initiatives of the government. If this reform is to be successful, these initiatives must first go some distance to improve the economic and social well-being of Bolivia's poor before they are fully trusted.

This analysis was prepared by COHA Research Associate Laura Starr

Pluralism Bursts into the Western Hemisphere

* While Russia, Europe and China are wooing Latin America and the Caribbean, the Monroe Doctrine now becomes the “Putin, Zapatero and Chinese – Corollary”
* Iran’s increased presence in the region may lead to bad press, but for now only shows increased investments
* The “Great Game” of political and economic influence is set to be played in the southern hemisphere

No one is arguing that Latin America and the Caribbean have become a priority matter for international diplomacy, save for the U.S., which has witnessed a massive retreat of Washington's vigilance for what it once insisted were its longtime national interests and influence in the hemisphere. Concentrating on its "War on Terror" has resulted in a detour of the U.S. military and diplomatic corps to a series of sorties, like Afghanistan, Iraq, and now, likely enough, to Iran. The 1823 Monroe Doctrine is no longer relevant as nations like Russia, the People's Republic of China as well as the European Union (and its individual members) increase their influence in the Western Hemisphere. This penetration is due to the fact that numerous hemispheric countries are themselves looking to diversify their pool of allies and trading partners by contracting ties to other nations besides the U.S., with Venezuela being at the core of this movement.

From Brussels to Moscow and Beijing, not to mention other emerging middle powers like India, it seems as though everyone wants a piece of Latin America these days. With Washington's grip on the region loosening, there is an increase in opportunity for potentially valuable non-traditional relationships – Iran's aggressive courting of Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua is one example– demonstrating that the Western Hemisphere has become a multipolar continent, with Washington no longer being the exclusive choice, and with diplomatic initiatives originating from around the globe.

Enter the Dragon

China has diverse interests in the Western Hemisphere, and although most of them are primarily economic, there are pressing political factors at play as well. Of key importance to Beijing is its quest for new product markets, in combination with creating multiple portals through which it can import the mineral resources and produce what it needs to maintain a booming economy. The most recent example is the $10 billion contract signed between Beijing and Caracas to search for crude oil reserves in Venezuela's oil-rich Orinoco belt. This arrangement occurred shortly after Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez expelled a number of Western oil companies from the country, including Exxon and Conoco, for failing to take a minority stake in their Orinoco oil holdings.

Another reason for China's interest in the Western Hemisphere has to do with the status of neighboring Taiwan. Beijing and Taipei's hostile attitude toward each other and quest for diplomatic recognition has been transferred to the Americas, as both governments attempt to gain new allies in order to bolster support for their positions on the issue of Beijing's claim to the island of Taiwan. Inevitably, Beijing is winning its diplomatic and public relations showdown with Taipei, due to its geopolitical weight. While Taiwan has gained the formal recognition of a number of countries in this hemisphere, it subsequently lost some of this support. This is being achieved as a result of an "open checkbook" policy for economic aid, access to the Chinese market, and the availability of loans for the disadvantaged economies of the Americas. The critical factor here is that China has been able to decisively beat out its adversary, with Taipei having diplomatic ties with only a handful of countries in the Western Hemisphere, most of which have only marginal importance other than their ability to cast a vote in international forums.

An example of this "financially mercenary" is the Caribbean island of Dominica, which cut ties with Taiwan in 2004. According to a report by the BBC, after the decision of Dominican Prime Minister Roosevelt Skerrit to cut off Taipei, Beijing was prepared to hand over more than $100 million in aid over the next five years to the now blessed Caribbean island.

The Russian Bear

Russia has just begun to regain a privileged position of influence in the Western Hemisphere, a status once enjoyed during the days of the Cold War when, as a result of its close ties with Havana, it was able to maintain close relations with Nicaragua, Grenada, and Allende's Chile. Moscow also had the sympathy of military governments like Peru during the Juan Velasco Alvarado rule (1968-1975). Today, Russia is attempting to come up with a new strategy to recover a resource-drilling position of influence in the hemisphere, and has focused on the military export industry as its line of attack. During the Cold War several Latin American governments purchased Soviet weaponry, and today are familiar with utilizing this type of equipment and prefer its use (not to mention Russian weapons are currently very inexpensive) over having to purchase them from other manufacturers (i.e. France, Israel). For example, Peru is in the process of upgrading its Soviet-era Mi-8 helicopters, having placed its order with Moscow.

Moscow has also capitalized on non-U.S. friendly countries like Venezuela to increase its client base. Last year Venezuela purchased $3 billion of military equipment from the Vladimir Putin regime. This summer, during a trip to Moscow, Chávez ordered five submarines, with the option of buying four more in the near future. In addition, Russia's Izhevsk Manufacturing Plant has reported that it will build two factories in Venezuela to manufacture Kalashnikov rifle-type AK-103 as well as ammunition for it. The objective is to have both plants completed by 2010.

However, it is doubtful that military sales alone will be enough for Russia to once again cement anything like the position of influence in the Western hemisphere that it episodically had in the post-World War II period. Trade is still somewhat lagging between the two sides of the Pacific, and there have been instances of rapprochement between Kremlin officials and a number of hemispheric leaders. Cuba has yet to receive anything approaching a major volume of Russian investment and economic aid, as it once did, although there is always the possibility that this situation may change in the near future. There have been some important visits by high level Kremlin officials, like President Vladimir Putin's trip to Cuba in 2000, as well as several meetings between Putin and Chávez in Moscow, however, these ties have to be amplified in order to make Russia into a bigger player in Latin America. Meanwhile, the region increasingly looks to Moscow for both friendship and, more importantly, trade and investment.

European Unity for All

Understanding Europe's presence in Latin America and the Caribbean may require two separate streams of analysis. On the one hand, the Europe Union has a common policy towards the Americas, and, at the same time, individual European countries have their own foreign policies and interests in the region. When it comes to the EU, Brussels has focused on greater economic and political interaction with the region's major blocs, namely MERCOSUR, the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), and the Rio Group. In fact, the EU has already been discussing a free-trade agreement with CAN for a number of months. In recent weeks, Venezuela has been placed in the spotlight as President Chávez is looking to possibly return to CAN after leaving the bloc in 2006. Chávez is not in favor of an FTA between CAN and the EU, so it is yet to be seen how these feints will transpire. In the meantime, CAN has scheduled its second round of negotiations with the EU in Brussels this coming December. Additionally, the EU has pursued free trade talks with countries like Mexico and Chile.

Individual European governments are pursuing their own foreign policy initiatives vis-à-vis the Western Hemisphere in line with their own national interests. France has increased its cooperation in recent years with Brazil. Likewise, Britain continues to make use of its historical influence on the English-speaking Caribbean, for example, maintaining a military base in Belize (the British Army Training Support Unit Belize – BATSUB). The goal of the base is to provide jungle training to British troops, with the additional objective of protecting the sovereignty of the country, which has had a historical territorial dispute with neighboring Guatemala. In addition, British naval ships regularly patrol the Caribbean and aid with drug-enforcement operations. In 2005, the frigate HMS Cumberland stopped a vessel off Nicaragua's Caribbean coast, which was carrying two tons of cocaine.

In addition, Spain and Portugal, in an attempt to project their presence in Latin America, encouraged the creation of the Ibero-American Secretaria (SEGIB) in 2006. The organization is based in Madrid and scored something of a coup after the distinguished Uruguayan official Enrique Iglesias was selected as its first secretary-general in 2005. Iglesias brought a significant amount of prestige to the organization as he is a former president of the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington, Uruguay's foreign minister from 1985-1988 and also served as the head of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Nevertheless, it is yet to be seen if SEGIB can make much progress in bringing both sides of the Atlantic effectively together.

In early November, the XVII Ibero-American Summit took place in Santiago, Chile. The meeting was not without controversy as at one point King Juan Carlos of Spain told President Chavez "por qué no te callas?" (why don't you shut up?). Ironically, SEGIB's secretary Iglesias declared in a press conference that the summit had been a success. The next meeting will take place in October 2008 in San Salvador, El Salvador.

Holland's presence in the region is mainly a result of its connection to its former colonies of Suriname and the islands of Aruba (Curacao and Saba off the coast of South America in the Caribbean), as well as St. Maarten, which it shares with France. Finally there are some European nations that particularly are at odds with one or more Latin American countries, especially with Fidel Castro's Cuba. The Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia are famous for their rejection of any effort to be made to moderate the current hostility that these former Soviet satellites currently have towards Cuba, which has rendered them a gaggle of Castro bashers serving on European bodies.

The Growing Persian Shadow

Iran is another country that has a mixed diplomatic-trade and security relationship with a number of regional countries, with Venezuela immediately coming to mind. Recently, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad caused an uproar in New York when he visited the UN and gave a fiery speech after being booed during a presentation he made at Columbia University. After his stopover in Caracas, Ahmadinejad traveled to Bolivia, prompting rumors of a possible Caracas-Tehran-Sucre/La Paz alliance. In order to explain his meeting with the Iranian leader, Bolivian President Evo Morales declared "we are from the culture of dialogue and life, without marginalization and discrimination. We are about unity [and] solidarity."

Visits by Ahmadinejad and other Iranian officials to the Western Hemisphere are examples of Tehran's growing presence in the continent. In early November, Iranian Minister of Commerce Masood Mirkazemi traveled to Havana and signed an agreement to form a joint shipping company between the two governments.

During his trip to Bolivia, the first made by an Iranian president, Ahmadinejad pledged to invest $1 billion over the next five years to improve the Bolivian economy. According to September 27 Associated Press file, "Bolivia-Iran trade can hardly go anywhere but up. Bolivia exported nothing to Iran between 2000 and 2006, and Iranian exports to Bolivia totaled just $10 million last year, according to government statistics, down from $24 million a year earlier." Closer relations between La Paz and Tehran have more than raised eyebrows among Bolivia's opposition parties. There are rumors that there may be a deal between both countries for the mining of Bolivia's uranium, which opposition senators would try to block, if true. "No one has assured us that Bolivian uranium will be used for benign purposes, so we cannot take risks," said Senator Arturo Murillo of Unidad Nacional.

In Ahmadinejad's September trip to Caracas, he met with Chávez and the two leaders signed three cooperation accords regarding the petrochemical, agricultural and automobile sectors. In addition, as reported by Latin America News Digest, Venezuela's state-run oil giant Petroleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA) and Iranian state-run energy firm Petropars have agreed to set up a 50/50 joint venture named Venirogc. The article explains that the goal is to challenge the supremacy of oil and gas giants Chevron, Royal Dutch Shell and Eni by creating international oil and gas enterprises along the entire value chain, from production to retail merchandizing through gasoline stations.

Additional Players

Brazil's increasing links to South Africa and India have aided both emerging middle-rank powers to gain a foothold in the Western Hemisphere. India also has a growing research-based presence in Guyana, which it gained by deploying historical ethnic ties, and has also used a diplomatic offensive to permit it to step up investments in mineral-rich Peru.

Pluralism in the Americas

Washington's semi-divorce from Latin America and the Caribbean has been the catalyst that has allowed other nations and international organizations to move rapidly into the regions. What can be seen now is the possibility of the creation of a new system in the Western Hemisphere, with the U.S. becoming no longer the omnipotent and omnipresent player. Washington may have to adjust to being one of many actors in the hemisphere along with Beijing, Moscow, Brussels and, oddly enough, Tehran.

In effect, a dramatically pluralistic hemisphere is in the making, which cannot help but profoundly affect the inter-American system, with the Organization of American States—which has always been regarded as Washington's protégé—losing ground to one or more of a variety of other possible regional blocks, like CARICOM, the Rio Group, the Andean Community of Nations, as well as Chávez' Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA).

Caribbean Security

While important from a geo-strategic point of view, the Caribbean does not usually attract the international media coverage it deserves. In spite of this fact, security forces from major powers like the U.S. and Britain continue to maintain security a presence in the area, especially as the Caribbean has become a major point for the shipment of illegal drugs coming from South America on their way to Europe.

London's BATSUB provides specialist training for over 4,000 British troops per year and offers back-up support to the Belize Defense Force (BDF). The British base also regularly receives visits by British vessels, like the Cumberland, that take part in anti-narcotics operations in the Caribbean Sea, often in conjunction with the U.S.

Washington aggressively has pressed the relatively unknown but very important "Shiprider Agreement" with a number of Caribbean countries. The objective of this pact is to combat illegal drug trafficking, arms smuggling and transnational crime by increasing cooperation between U.S. security forces (particularly the Coast Guard) and Caribbean governments. From the onset, the "Shiprider Agreement" has been surrounded by controversy; for example, there have been confrontations between the U.S., Jamaica.
According to a February 2004 article in the Jamaica Gleaner, “in 1996, then U.S. President Bill Clinton’s administration was on the verge of imposing financial sanctions against Jamaica because it was dissatisfied with Jamaica’s co-operation on narcotics. Sanctions were eventually averted after the crisis prompted a Caribbean summit in Barbados with Clinton in 1997.” Jamaica and Washington signed a new “Shiprider” accord in 2004.

On January 26, 2006 an article was published in Caribbean Net News, which included comments by the U.S. ambassador to Suriname, Marsha Barnes. In the article the American diplomat said that so far, there are no tangible results from the proposed cooperation since Suriname doesn't have a Coast Guard. The diplomat noted that agreements with other Caribbean nations were exercised differently. Some Caribbean nations' vessels patrolling off-shore Puerto Rico have U.S. law enforcement officers on board, while in other instances Caribbean law enforcement personnel are on board U.S. Coast Guard vessels.

Additionally, the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), in coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard, sponsors a series of military exercises held with Caribbean nations, known as TRADEWINDS. The May 2007 TRADEWINDS exercises were held in Belize with the participation of the British Royal Marines. It is noteworthy to mention that the Caribbean has strived to achieve independence when it comes to security issues. In the late 1970s and 1980s, the need for a collective response to security threats led to the creation of the Regional Security System. This concept first appeared in concrete terms through a Memorandum of Understanding which was signed in October 1982 between Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia and Barbados, in order to provide for "mutual assistance on request." The RSS' first deployment was a part of the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983. Grenada itself joined the RSS in 1985.

Who Supports Who?

In spite of the growing presence of extra-hemispheric nations in the Western Hemisphere, it might be an exaggeration to assume that exclusive alliances have been cemented between any Latin American or Caribbean nations with particular European or Asian powers. Brazil has developed close relations with India and South Africa (through the tri-national organization known as IBSA), which is perhaps the closest there is to an inter-hemispheric alliance at the moment. In addition, Britain has a strong relation with its former colonies, but at the same time, the Caribbean states have had success in forming their own identity through regional organizations like CARICOM.

Mexico's growing closeness with the EU, China and India on trade issues will continue to be dwarfed by its relationship with the U.S., its major trading partner by far. The same can be said about Central America and the Dominican Republic, after the ratification by all members of CAFTA-DR. President Chávez has turned to Russia as a weapons supplier, but he had no problems granting China, Russia's competitor in the quest for overseas resources, a multi-billion dollar deal for oil exploration.

An issue that needs to be addressed is that of shifts and movements in inter-state relations on the continent and the search for external alliances. Brazil, with is global ambitions, has teamed up with other regional powers in other parts of the world that share similar interests. Venezuela turned to Russia for military equipment because when requested, the U.S. would not sell the Chávez administration spare parts to repair the country's squadron of aging F-16 fighter planes. Adjoining countries like Peru, Uruguay and Paraguay, have yet to feel any need to seek stable extra-hemispheric alliances.

Another condition that deserves to be considered is the fear that allowing too many foreign companies or foreign influence in a country will be detrimental to local economies or create neo-colonial scenarios. For example, some Caribbean analysts still bitterly recall CARICOM's distrust which was directed against France's then-Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin, with some officials of the Caribbean organization alleging that he was one of the main plotters of the Haitian 2004 coup that overthrew President Jean Bertrand Aristide.

It is unrealistic to believe that a Russian or Asian military base may be located in the Western Hemisphere anytime soon. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that non-American military bases in Latin America and the Caribbean do exist. One example is the aforementioned British military training facility in Belize. France has also deployed members of its Foreign Legion to French Guyana, an overseas department, for training exercises and to protect the European Space Agency spacecrafts which are launched from there. Furthermore, the status of U.S. facilities in the region is no longer secure or, for that matter, sacred. Ecuador's President Rafael Correa adamantly insists that once the lease to the U.S. facility in Manta expires in 2009, Quito will refuse to renew it. Meanwhile Mexican authorities have stressed that no U.S. military forces will be allowed in the country as part of the newly signed Merida initiative.

El Gran Juego

Like the struggle for influence in Central Asia in the 19th century between the Russian and British empires, which was referred to at the time as the Great Game, Latin America and the Caribbean have entered into their own version of this quest, with non-hemispheric players like Russia, China and the European Union all attempting to win influence in the region. This translates into investment, access to resources and local markets; however it is not a winner-takes-all type of game. One thing is clear: for the rest of the world, efforts at associating with Latin America and the Caribbean signifies the region's emergence as an important political and economic force with potential for further growth, which is even far beyond what Washington is now able to conceptualize.

This analysis was prepared by COHA Research Fellow Alex Sánchez

TABASCO… UNA HISTORIA DE DESASTRES
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La tragedia se repite. Desde hace años, científicos y especialistas advirtieron sobre el riesgo que corrían los habitantes de Tabasco, pues este estado del sur de nuestro país se encuentra en una región geográficamente peligrosa.

Desde la década de los cincuenta se pusieron en marcha una serie de obras y programas urbanos industriales, que entre otros objetivos, tenían el de controlar las inundaciones. Entonces se construyeron las presas de Malpaso, La Angostura, Chicoasén y Peñitas, en los ríos de Grijalva y Usumacinta, además de otros proyectos que quedaron en el papel. Sin embargo, fueron soluciones de momento, sin una verdadera proyección a futuro.

En 1999, Tabasco tuvo un primer aviso. Hubo inundaciones de hasta 2 metros de altura, provocadas por el desbordamiento del río Grijalva y precipitaciones de aproximadamente 400 milímetros cúbicos.

Hoy, con más del 70% de su territorio bajo el agua, y con una serie de construcciones inconclusas y las finalizadas insuficientes para el tamaño de la catástrofe –advertida por expertos–, Tabasco padece las consecuencias de la irresponsabilidad del gobierno local y federal.

Para darnos una idea: a comparación de los 400 milímetros cúbicos de lluvia de 1999, a consecuencia de un frente frío, cayeron alrededor de mil milímetros cúbicos de lluvia. Calentamiento global o incompetencia gubernamental, la tragedia se pudo evitar.

OBRAS INCONCLUSAS… ¿LA CAUSA?

La Comisión Nacional del Agua (Conagua) y el gobernador Manuel Andrade acordaron en el 2003 un Proyecto Integral Contra Inundaciones (PICI) en Tabasco, el cual debió concluir en el 2006 con una inversión de 2 mil 60 millones de pesos.

Sin embargo, las obras no han avanzado como debieran y falta hasta el 2012 para que se concluyan. Este podría ser un motivo más por el cual las afectaciones en Tabasco y Chiapas se incrementaron, luego de las recientes lluvias, el desbordamiento de ríos y la saturación en las presas.

En dicho proyecto firmado por el director de Conagua, Cristóbal Jaime Jáquez y Manuel Andrade (entonces gobernador de Tabasco), se detallaba la inversión que harían el gobierno federal (un 70%) y el gobierno estatal (un 30%), sumando en total 2 mil 60 millones de pesos. Pero hasta la fecha, por motivos no conocidos, sólo se han gastado mil 500 millones.

Adicionalmente a esto, la Secretaría de Finanzas del gobierno de Tabasco reveló que de los 4 mil 258 millones de pesos que por concepto de excedentes petroleros recibió la entidad entre los años de 2003 y 2006, el Sistema de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Tabasco ejerció 855 millones 800 mil pesos, mientras la Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Urbano, Obras Públicas y Vivienda, gastó mil 920 millones de pesos.

En entrevista sobre esta situación, el subdirector técnico de la Comisión Nacional del Agua, Felipe Arreguín Cortés, aseguró que el proyecto se encuentra en una etapa intermedia de aplicación, ya que dio inició en el año de 2003 y está programado para concluir hasta el año de 2012. Además, hizo notar que las obras tienen un avance como el previsto hasta la fecha.

El proyecto tiene como objetivo evitar las inundaciones –como la de 1999– que afectaron las mismas zonas actuales, y con ello prevenir una catástrofe que tendría un costo de hasta 16 mil millones de pesos.

Los tres sistemas que constituyen el PICI son: Mezcalapa-Samaria, La Sierra y Carrizal-Medellín. Con ellos se busca, ante todo, brindar una protección integral contra lluvias extraordinarias y sus efectos en los niveles de los ríos Samaria, Carrizal, La Sierra y Grijalva, para lo cual se busca confinar las corrientes, conduciendo los excedentes lejos de los centros urbanos para evitar daños a la población, señala el documento de la Conagua.

"El Proyecto Integral Contra Inundaciones de la Planicie de los ríos Grijalva-Usumacinta, contempla acciones en beneficio de los municipios de Centro, Nacajuca, Cuanduacán, Teapa, Jalapa y Centla, con la construcción de 179 kilómetros de bordos, 190 kilómetros de drenes y tres estructuras de control que permitirán proteger a más de 370 mil habitantes, rescatar 25 mil 400 hectáreas de tierras productivas, 20 mil de uso pecuario y 5 mil 400 de uso agrícola", señala el plan de la Conagua. Sin embargo, tanto funcionarios públicos de Tabasco como federales, han reconocido que faltaron recursos para entregarlos a la entidad y continuar con la labor proyectada, por lo que se solicitaría este año el incremento presupuestal para concluir con las obras.

LA SOLIDARIDAD, MARCA DEL PUEBLO MEXICANO

Ante la emergencia, diversos grupos de la sociedad civil, organizados y no organizados, empresas, instituciones nacionales e internacionales, y hasta gobiernos de los cinco continentes, han brindado apoyo y ayuda a Tabasco.

En el último balance de la situación presentada por el Presidente Calderón, se afirma que el 80% de la población tabasqueña resultó afectada, 360 mil "totalmente afectada" (340 mil en tabasco y 11 mil en Chiapas); hay 125 mil personas en albergues y 50 mil familias en sitios de mayor anegamiento.

Hasta hoy, han trabajado unidos el sector privado, la sociedad civil, los gobiernos en sus tres niveles, esto se ha debido a la enorme solidaridad de la población y los donativos de ropa, comida, enseres y de la participación de voluntarios.

La coordinadora general de Protección Civil de la Secretaría de Gobernación, lsaura Gurza, declaró que ya concluyeron las tareas de búsqueda y rescate, y que ahora procede una etapa permanente de transición de apoyo a la población.

Desde el 2 de noviembre se ha apoyado a la población con más de 5 mil 800 toneladas de ayuda humanitaria, aportaciones económicas con ofrecimientos por más de 100 millones de pesos, más lo acumulado en cuentas bancarias.

Sin embargo, aún no es suficiente la ayuda, pues "vienen etapas de desesperanza para la gente que cobra conciencia de lo que ha perdido y la dificultad y el esfuerzo con el que le llevó construir todo lo que en un segundo pudo perder", como aseguro Isaura Gurza.

… Y LOS BUITRES SE TRATAN DE APROVECHAR

Ante la desgracia, siempre hay buitres dispuestos a lucrar política o económicamente con la desgracia ajena. Este fue el caso del ex candidato López, quien hizo una aparición pública para “convocar a ayudar a Tabasco” y para descalificar al gobierno y a la sociedad declarando que “estaría muy atento al uso de los recursos”.

La respuesta de la sociedad, de su pueblo natal, fue un vacío, un reproche… Cuando todos necesitamos unirnos, las voces discordantes únicamente lastiman y hieren en lugar de ayudar.

Quien quiera usar a Tabasco como botín político o como medio para pegar a sus rivales, está cometiendo el error más grande que se puede cometer hoy con nuestros hermanos de Tabasco. Pero afortunadamente, es mucha más la gente comprometida con la verdad, con la vida, y con la solidaridad.

Si bien es verdad que han existido errores y negligencia por parte de los gobiernos estatal y federal, también es cierto que no es la hora de buscar culpables, sino de tender puentes a esos hermanos que lo han perdido todo.

Es hora de que azules, amarillos, rojos, verdes, nos unamos, porque no se trata de política, sino de vida; no es campaña, es supervivencia. Investiguemos qué ha pasado con esos recursos y por qué no se han aplicado en lo que se tenían que aplicar, sí, pero no como un medio de ganar políticamente, sino como una forma de evitar posibles futuras catástrofes como esta.

En tí está seguir ayudando, independientemente de los colores. Hay niños que podrían ser tus hijos, hay mujeres que podrían ser tu madre, hay ancianos que podrían ser tu abuelo, y ellos necesitan de tu ayuda. TIÉNDELES LA MANO, y unidos,SOLIDARIAMENTE saldremos adelante.

OPINIÓN Octavio Islas

Genuina expresión del voluntarismo acrítico -una joya más de la filosofía Abascal- ¿Qué caso tiene reparar en las responsabilidades y corruptelas de los gobiernos priistas de Tabasco y las omisiones criminales de don Vicente -tan ocupado en consentit a Martita-.